Monday, November 30, 2015

Strategic Alliances


In 2013, Amazon entered into a strategic alliance with Proctor & Gamble. Strategic alliance is a cooperative strategy. It exists whenever two or more independent organizaions cooperate in the development, manufacture, or sale of products or services. So, both Amazon and P&G maintain their autonomy, but they still gain a new opportuntiy.

In this partnership, Amazon uses a portion of P&G's warehouses for packaging and distribution of only P&G products. As a result, Amazon gets quicker and cheaper distribution (that's one less trip the goods have to make) and Amazon can use their original warehouse space for higher-margin items (P&G focuses on consumer goods like diapers and toiletries). P&G benefits by cutting their transportation costs (again, that's one less trip the goods have to make), as well as having Amazon promote their products online (equaling higher sales).

Note that there are three diferent types of strategic alliances:
  1. Nonequity
  2. Equity
  3. Joint venture
What Amazon and P&G agreed to would fall under a nonequity strategic alliance, as they did not take quity positions in each other; it is more of a contractual alliance, not a formal legal partnership, as the other types are.

By 2015, P&G ranks on the first page of results on Amazon.com for over 40% of its individual products, and close to a third of its products are among the top 50 in their category in the number of reviews per listing on Amazon.

It's important for both parties in a strategic alliance to feel like they are benefitting; when the relationship is one-sided or mis-balanced, trouble can ensure... And this includes all stakeholders involved, like suppliers and retailers.

Such is the case with Target. Their reactin to the Amazon/P&G strategic alliance was to, essentially, punish them. To Target, they perceived the strategic alliance as favoritism. So, in 2013, Target moved P&G's products to less-prominent spaces in stores and started working directly with other suppliers to boost their sales (versus P&G's).

If strategic alliances can be as beneficial to Amazon as it has been with P&G, we should keep an eye out for similar partnerships... and what suppliers and retailers have to say about them...

Sources:
  • Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage by Jay B. Barney [textbook]
  • Amazon Makes Strategic Alliance with Procter & Gamble by evigo.com [http://evigo.com/6627-amazon-makes-strategic-alliance-with-procter-gamble/]
  • P&G Gets Caught in Rivalry Between Amazon and Target by Jeremy Bowman [http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/03/06/pg-gets-caught-in-rivalry-between-amazon-and-targe.aspx]
  • P&G’s Strategic Partnership with Alliance by bmcrosby [https://bmcrosby.wordpress.com/2012/04/13/pgs-strategic-partnership-with-alliance/]

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

Implementing Corporate Diversification

Amazon considers its unrelated corporate strategy a competitive advantage because it's valuable, rare, and costly to imitate. In order to not squander its potential (and its profits), Amazon has to ensure it is appropriately and efficiently organized.

To achieve this, Amazon uses an M-form, or multidivisional structure. This structure is made up of multiple divisions (profit and loss centers), each with a vice president that reports directly to the CEO. Amazon defines its divisions by the different products and services it offers, so that the vice presidents can focus on their respective products and services. Since Amazon is such a large organization, this is the most beneficial, flexible set-up. (Other options would be to divide by brand name or geographic area.) Also, because Amazon is so large, dividing the company in this manner can help give outside equity holders a birds-eye view of each vice presidents' decision-making activities (monitoring), reassuring them that the decisions are consistent with their interests (bonding).

Below is how it would appear in the annual report (the board of directors, the senior executive, corporate staff, division general managers, and shared activity managers --- discussed below). To put it in scope, Amazon has over 51,300 employees globally, spanning corporate offices, fulfillment centers, customer service centers and software development centers across North America, Europe, and Asia.





The board of directors
One of the major monitoring devices is the board of directors, to whom all senior managers report. Their primary responsibility is to monitor the decision-making int he firm to ensure that it is consistent with the interests of outside equity holders. Amazon's board of directors is organized into several subcommittees: The audit committee is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of accounting and financial statements; the personnel and compensation committee evaluates and compensates the performance of senior executives and other senior managers; and the nominating committee nominates new board members. (In fact, Amazon has been recognized for the two women they have serving on their board.)


The senior executive
CEO Jeff Bezos has two main responsibilities: strategy formulation (focuses on which businesses Amazon should compete in and how... Essentially defining the economies of scope) and strategy implementation (focuses on encouraging appropriate cooperation among divisions in order to exploit valuable economies of scope). These two implementations come together to assure investors that Amazon's strategy is profitable, cannot be duplicated, and has strong operations and activities.


Corporate staff
The primary responsibility of the corporate staff is to provide information to the CEO about external and internal environments. This role is especially important because it assists the CEO in making good decisions about the strategy formulation and implementation; they are essentially the compass.

Division general managers
Primarily responsible for the day-to-day activities, and have full profit-and-loss responsibilities. They choose strategy formulation for their direct reports, aligning it with the CEO's. Their strategy implementation responsibilities parallel the CEO's. Since they must align the with CEO as well as the multiple functional managers that report to them, there is a lot of coordination that goes on before implementing anything. Additionally, they fight for corporate capital (by generating a high rate of return) and cooperate with other division general managers to exploit corporate economies of scope. Although the division general managers are competing for capital, they do understand that, if each division sees high levels of economic performance, then Amazon, as diversified as they are, is more likely to do well as a whole, too.

Shared activity managers
Common sales forces, common distribution centers, common manufacturing facilities, and common research and development efforts can help multiple stages of Amazon's value chain, even though they are inherently diversified. This is often obscured in a traditional annual report, so the below is redrawn to emphasize roles and responsibilities. The corporate staff groups are separated from shared activity managers, and each is shown reporting to its primary internal "customer," or the CEO/two or more division general managers.



See that the following analysis is apparent:
CEO and founder Jeffery Bezos and an eight-member board of directors sit at the top and monitor all activities below them. The CEO oversees the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), the Chief Technology Officer and the following 8 departments: Business Development, eCommerce Platform, International Retail, North America Retail, Web Services, Digital Media, Legal & Secretary, and Kindle. The CFO oversees the Real Estate and Control department. International Retail oversees three separate departments: China, Europe and India. North America Retail oversees the following five departments: Seller Services, Operations, Toys, Sports & Home Improvement, Amazon Publishing and Music & Video. The Web Services department oversees Amazon S3 and Database Services. Other departments include Product Development & Studios, Europe Operations, Global Advertising Sales, Computing Services, and Global Customer Fulfillment.
Sources:
  • Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage by Jay B. Barney [textbook]
  • Amazon 05 - Diversification Strategy by Pere Joan [http://www.slideshare.net/PereJoan1/amazon-05-diversification-strategy]
  • EST 325: Amazon.com by Fabrice Guillaume [https://stonybrook.digication.com/fguillaume/Organizational_Structure1]
  • Amazon.com Board of Directors Committee Membership by Amazon.com [http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-govmanage]

Amazon's (Rare) Unrelated Diversification Strategy is a Worry


Diversification is a corporate strategy in which a firm brings multiple businesses within its boundaries. Firms may vary in the extent to which they diversify the mix of businesses they pursue, and this is usually decided by their relatedness.

For Amazon, they have an unrelated corporate diversification. This means that they pursue numerous different businesses, and there are little to no linages between them. Consider their foray into cloud services, electronics (including their home-grown Kindle), toys, tools, kitchenware, and more. Plus, their sub-sections like Amazon Web Services, the Fire phone, the FireTV, Amazon Fresh, and partnership with multiple online stores (like Zappos). CEO Jeff Bezos is doing everything in his power to realize his goal: to be the internet's one-stop shop. See below for how fast they have grown.

Unfortunately, to stay ahead of competitors, Amazon must be a first-mover, which often means not waiting for a profit to turn before jumping into another product category... or having any experience in it. For as many sales as Amazon gets (almost $1billion in only the Christmas season), they barely turn a profit. They expand per opportunity versus financial ability... Just as most unrelated diversified firms are. They are more cost-burdened than their counterparts that choose a related diversified strategy.

For example, choosing such a strategy means they have too many products to put into a single diversification center. It takes an average of 3.67 shipments to complete one order (called "split shipments"). Additionally, new markets don't sell themselves; Amazon needs to continually increasing their marketing budget as they increase their product range.

Motivation could include risk reduction, tax advantages, exploiting market share, growing firm to increase employee compensation. Typically, the value created by these for unrelated diversification is quite small;investors don't take kindly to a "sales before profit" mindset. This is why research generally shows that related diversified firms outperform unrelated diversified firms; they have a "profit before sales" mindset.

However, Amazon has gained a customer base and analytics into shopping habits that no other retailer (both online and physical) can match. And they show no sign of scaling back their diversification. Hopefully those two premises can find a way to work together to produce an easily-profitable and sustainable company.

Sources
  • Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage by Jay B. Barney [textbook]
  • Amazon Looks to Diversification in Drive for Profit by Stephen Phillips [http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Amazon-looks-to-diversification-in-drive-for-profit]
  • Amazon 05 - Diversification Strategy by Pere Joan [http://www.slideshare.net/PereJoan1/amazon-05-diversification-strategy]

Friday, November 20, 2015

Amazon's Backward Vertical Integration Strategy


Every company has a value chain (the set of discrete activities that must be accomplished to design, build, sell, and distribute a product or service) and each activity listed in the value chain must be accomplished in order for the product to be sold to customers. Firms can decide which of those activities they engage in, and which other firms can engage in. The greater the number, the more vertically integrated the firm is.

Vertical integration occurs when a customer either buys or starts a company and integrates it into their current business. Note that this number doesn't have to remain constant over time; companies can engage in forward vertical integration (getting closer to the end customer) or backward vertical integration (getting farther from the end customer).

One of Amazon's biggest value chain moments was when they decided to revolutionize the digital books business by exclusively publishing books aimed at its Kindle platform. In this move, Amazon successfully removed the publishing houses, or "middle men," from the process. By owning this piece of the value chain, Amazon would be handling every step of a book's life cycle after it's been written (editing, producing, marketing, selling, and even providing the device needed to read it.), and thus redefining how customers interact with and relate to e-books.

Using this backward vertical integration as a source of competitive advantage can be hard, but Amazon (even through backlashes from Apple and other book retailers) can tell the value added as a percent of sales (which is the best way to tell the success in any act of vertical integration). By creating a user experience that completely changed the way users interact with and relate to e-books, Amazon has the chance to own the market and drive the future of e-books commerce.

Will this move guarantee Amazon a number one position in the seller of e-books? They currently have a seventy percent market share, but there are still competitors, like Barnes & Noble's Nook that is undergoing vertical integration of their own. This leads to the bigger question: How else will the internet affect other companies' value chains?

Sources
  • Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage by Jay B. Barney [textbook]
  • Moving Into the 3rd Dimension of Vertical Integration by Nurun Team [http://www.nurun.com/en/our-thinking/future-of-retail/moving-into-the-3rd-dimension-of-vertical-integration/]
  • Amazon, Apple, and the Perils of Vertical Integration by Tim Worstall [http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/04/23/amazon-apple-and-the-perils-of-vertical-integration/]
  • Amazon Your Industry: Extracting Value from the Value Chain by Booz and Company [http://www.strategy-business.com/article/10479?gko=7b809]

Thursday, November 12, 2015

Booksellers Seek Tacit Collusion to Fight Against Amazon




Amazon has a competitive strategy when it comes to their e-books: First, offer the cheapest prices. Second, become the monopoly. 

Done and done. 

In 2012, Amazon offered top-notch, brand new e-books for an astoundingly low price of $9.99, sometimes even coming at a loss to themselves (this was lower than what they were even paying the publishers for the books). Whether their plan was simply predatory pricing or gaining a competitive advantage in order to raise prices in the future, it doesn't matter. Other booksellers noticed this move. Since they didn't have pockets as deep as Amazon, they were worried.

Seeing this threat of rivalry, Apple and five other major book sellers realized that with a price that low, they would be less likely to earn economic profits. So, they successfully implemented a collusive strategy in order to exploit an opportunity to neutralize the threat: coordinate their production and pricing strategies indirectly by observing the output and pricing decisions of other firms. (Otherwise known as tactic collusion.) 

To break Amazon's monopoly, these publishers raised prices. To do this, Apple conspired with the publishers so they would all move from the $9.99 “wholesale” model to a tiered “agency” model that gave publishers the power to dictate retail prices, after which they coordinated a price hike. This would ultimately raise book prices by up to 40%, thus challenging Amazon and forcing them to raise its prices or lose access to all those books if they did not accept the new arrangement. 

Funny enough, this resulted in the Department of Justice (DOJ) filing an antitrust lawsuit against Apple and the other publishers, the penalties of which are in effect until 2018. At that time, we will get to see if the agency model can prevail, even if it started from less-than-wholesome foundations.

More importantly, I stated that this was a tacit collusion strategy. Collusion of any sort exists when firms in an industry agree to coordinate their strategic choices to reduce competition in an industry. However, with Apple being at the center of the conversations with the other publishers, it sounds like it could potentially be explicit collusion, especially now that the law is involved (explicit collusion is typically illegal). Two other reasons this could be explicit collusion:
  1. It's explicit when firms negotiate production output and pricing agreements directly in order to reduce competition.
  2. The best way a firm can learn what its rivals' intentions are is to communicate directly with each other about their current price and output decisions and their future price and output decisions. Then they can jointly maximize profits.
According to the evidence, Apple could have talked to each publisher separately and this could be the result of “parallel” actions by competitors facing the same market pressures. The fact remains that there was coordination and intent to co-operate, and they are a great example of a business-level cooperative strategy -- we don't have $9.99 Amazon e-books anymore, do we?

Sources: 
  • Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage by Jay B. Barney [textbook]
  • Litigation & Trial by Max Kennerly [http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2012/04/articles/business-lawsuits/apple-ebooks-antitrust/]
  • Pick your Monopoly: Apple or Amazon? by Steven Pearlstein [https://www.washingtonpost.com/pick-your-monopoly-apple-or-amazon/2012/03/05/gIQA0kBB4R_story.html]

Saturday, November 7, 2015

Amazon: Stubborn and Flexible

No matter how big a company is, there is the chance for risk and uncertainty while strategic decisions are being made, and it can be argued that the way a company reacts can make or break them. Risk arises when there is a possibility for multipole outcomes, which results in uncertainty. During this time, decisions that enhance flexibility are more important than ever.

Under conditions of high uncertainty, flexibility is crucial for survival. Luckily, Amazon is not hurting in this area. Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon, has publicly stated that "We are stubborn on vision. We are flexible on the details."

In reality, a company has six 'real options,' or the right to make an irreversible investment on or before the date an opportunity ceases to be available. This is one way that businesses can implement flexibility. It also helps value a company that can provide some type of future flexibility in a way that traditional financial analytics can't provide (like NPV or IRR).
  1. Defer
  2. Grow
  3. Contract
  4. Shut down and restart
  5. Abandon
  6. Expand
For example, when Amazon only sold books, their real options were as follows:
  1. Grow
    1. New business options (zShops, AmazonAuctions)
    2. Acquisitions (including Drugstore.com, Ashford.com, Della.com, Pets.com, Greenlight.com ....and 23 more)
    3. New customers (began selling music, videos and DVDs in 1998; software, toys, electronic products and home products in 1999; kitchenware and gardening products in 2000)
  2. Expand
    1. In 1999, they expanded outside the United States and entered the European market
In fact, over 90% of Amazon's innovative ideas is incremental and, as a result, less risky (see the year gaps). We can tell by their history of real options that giving up is not in their cards.

In Amazon's case, they hate risk. Bezos says, “Good entrepreneurs don’t like risk; they seek to reduce risk…Starting a company is already risky, and then you systematically eliminate risk step by step in those early days….you kind of need to systematically identify risk and then as the company gets bigger and more robust, you can start taking risks again but in those early days a lot of it is about ‘okay I have a good idea, how do we reduce risk?’”

Stay stubborn and flexible, Amazon.

Sources:

  • 12 Business Lessons You Can Learn from Amazon Founder and CEO Jeff Bezos by Zach Bulygo [https://blog.kissmetrics.com/lessons-from-jeff-bezos/]
  • Amazon’s Innovation Philosophy Braden Kelley [http://www.innovationexcellence.com/blog/2012/07/30/amazons-innovation-philosophy/#sthash.KBbCt75C.dpuf]
  • Using real options in strategic decision making by Chris Walters and Tim Giles http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/paradigm/spring2000/articles/walters-decision_making.html]
  • Valuing real options: frequently made errors by Pablo Fernández [http://www.ucema.edu.ar/u/jd/Inversiones/Articulos/Paper_Valuing_Real_Options_Frequent_errors.pdf]